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1.   Introduction to Peacekeeping Theory 
During the Cold War period, UN Peacekeeping was largely seen as an outcome of power politics. Its 
main function was to avert conflict escalating between the greater powers. Moreover, peacekeeping 
was conceived mainly by Western powers as a means of promoting the stability of friendly regimes 
and securing their economic interests in their former colonies. Therefore, peacekeeping was initially 
a creation of power politics and a tool of conflict containment. 
 
Nevertheless, peacekeeping was also a non-violent third party intervention by impartial, non-aligned 
as well as small states. Peacekeeping as an innovative non-coercive sort of military intervention had 
the potential to encourage and promote conflict resolution between the warring parties. 
 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse have summarised the two most general approaches in relation to the 
debate on the role of the United Nations in contemporary times: 
 
“As principal world legitimiser, the UN may be said to represent the International Community as 
a whole. Yet it is widely seen as the creation of great power politics, and in particular of United 
States national interest (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 158).” 
 
Some scholars have pointed out the influence of conflict theory on the enactment of the classical 
peacekeeping principles. Johan Galtung associated peacekeeping practice to the promotion of 
negative peace, or the absence of physical violence (Galtung 1976). On the other hand, John Burton 
related peacekeeping to the repressive mechanisms through which states protect their interests at an 
international level (Burton 1990).  
 
At the end of the Cold War, the role of the UN as the main world legitimiser became more 
prominent. The UN embodies the willingness of the great powers to promote peace in those areas 
where Cold War rivalries had fuelled instability and violence. In this international framework, UN 
Peacekeeping has added the task of resolving conflicts to its function as a conflict stabiliser. Thus, 
peacekeeping is understood as a type of third party intervention which can promote transformative 
policies. In this context, the UN is linked to the problem solving model of intervention and, more 
specifically, to the Conflict Resolution field of knowledge. Peacekeeping within the problem solving 
paradigm addresses the peaceful transformation of conflict through societal accountability of power 
holders (processes of democratisation, self-determination, human rights monitoring, truth 
commissions) and reconciliation of divided communities. 
 
Therefore, there are two approaches to peacekeeping practice: During the Cold War peacekeeping 
was used by the great powers to stabilise conflicts fuelled by superpower rivalries and to protect 
Western economic interests.  Cold War de-escalation provided an opportunity for the problem 
solving model to be applied in many protracted conflicts throughout the 5 continents. However, in 
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some peacekeeping operations, the influence of power politics has remained substantial and the 
interests of the great world powers have hindered conflict resolution initiatives. In the context of the 
US led war against terrorism, Western powers conceived peacekeeping as a stabilisation1 force rather 
than a conflict resolution tool.  
 
Figure 1. Peacekeeping Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.   Conflict Background 
The United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity have been reviewing the situation of the 
Western Sahara Territory since 1963. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) have passed annual 
resolutions calling for the self-determination of the Spanish Sahara which is based on the UNGA 
Resolution 1514 (XV), “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and 
Peoples”. This declaration stated that all non-self governing peoples had the right to self-
determination and that immediate steps had to be taken to transfer all powers to them. The ‘self’ is an 
expression of the principle of uti possidetis by which colonial boundaries are to be retained after 
independence (Chopra 1997: 52). The General Assembly requested on advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice in 1975. The ICJ concluded that Morocco or Mauritania had no claims 
to territorial sovereignty within Western Sahara. Therefore, according to UNGA’s 1514 resolution 
stated that de-colonisation doctrine and the right of self-determination of Western Sahara should be 
implemented.  
 
After nine decades of Spanish domination, the territories of Western Sahara were ceded by Spain to 
Morocco and Mauritania without consulting the will of its inhabitants. This took place in 1975. 
Franco’s regime promises to Saharawi people a Referendum which was to be held under UN 
auspices in the first half of 1975, but instead, the Western Sahara was given to Morocco and 
Mauritania in a tripartite agreement. This gave Spain a 35% stake in Fosbucraa (the company which 
exploits the important deposits of phosphate at Bou-Craa) and secured guarantees for Spanish fishing 
interests off the coast of Morocco and Western Sahara. The Madrid Accords signed on 14 November 
1975 did not comply with International Law2 (UN charters articles 1, 2, and 55; AGNU resolutions 
1.514 (XV), 1.541 (XV) and 2.625 (XXV), etc.; OUA charter article 1, -d;…).  
                                                 
1  New peacekeeping operations are named Stabilisation forces, i.e.  NATO-led Stabilisation Force in  
    Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) activated on 20 December 1996. 
2  For further information (Marino 1991:181) 
UN Peacekeeping
Power Politics Model
Conflict Stabiliser
Problem Solving Model
Conflict Resolver
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Since 1966, the United Nations General Assembly had been requesting Spain to initiate a 
Referendum. In May 1975, a United Nations mission of inquiry claimed that “an overwhelming 
consensus among Saharans within the territory in favour of independence and opposing integration 
with any neighbouring country”. They also reported the general support of the population for the 
Western Saharan pro-independence armed movement called the POLISARIO Front. On 27 February 
1976 the Provisional Saharawi National Council proclaimed a new state, the Saharan Arab 
Democratic Republic, which, in the same year, was recognised by 10 African countries and North 
Korea (Balta 1994: 148). Up to 75 states recognised the new Saharan state but only the former 
Yugoslavia (1984) and Albania (1987) were not in the South. At that time, Algeria began to provide 
military supplies to the POLISARIO and they started a guerrilla campaign against the Mauritanian 
and Moroccan armies which lasted until 1989. Most Saharawi refugees flew to Tindouf (Algeria) and 
POLISARIO headquarters were based there up to present.  
 
The conflict in Western Sahara quickly progressed to an internationalised war which involved 
countries fighting for the supremacy of Magreb, mainly Morocco, Algeria and Libya, and those who 
were involved in the cold war: the USSR and the USA and their respective allies. United States’ 
support for Morocco dates back to the Second World War, when the American troops landed along 
Moroccan coasts and Roosevelt promised to help Mohammed V achieve independence for his 
country from France and, in return,  the Americans acquired  an important ally because of Moroccan 
strategic position at the entrance to the Mediterranean sea (Aguirre 1991: 209). 
 
In 1988 the Cold War came to an end and Morocco and Algeria were reconciled,3 so the UN’s calls 
for the organisation of a self-determination referendum were finally headed by the Moroccan King 
Hassan II. In May 1988, the UN Secretary General and the OAU chairman initiated separate talks 
with the political leaders of Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and SADR and in July, secret talks were 
held between Saharawi and Moroccan representatives under the auspices of the Saudi Arabian 
government in Taef. In August 11 1988, the UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar, presented the 
settlement proposals of a peace plan to Morocco and POLISARIO. 
 
The 1988 UN-OAU settlement proposals foresaw the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in 
the Sahara to supervise a ceasefire (establishing a buffer zone in the sand wall) and to organise a free 
and fair referendum for the self-determination of the Saharan people. The plan also included 
measures to support the return of Saharan refugees, the exchange of prisoners of war and the release 
of political prisoners.  
 
                                                 
3 They formalised their reconciliation by creating the Arab Maghreb Union on the 17th of February    
    1989. 
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3.   Evaluation of MINURSO 
Peacekeeping operations have traditionally been assessed in relation to two variables (Diehl, 
Druckman and Wall 1998; Fetherston 2000). Firstly, the ability to limit armed conflict, this is the 
operation's capacity to achieve negative peace. Secondly, the promotion of conflict resolution, this is 
the operation’s capacity to achieve positive peace (Galtung 1976). Most studies on peacekeeping 
point out its efficiency in terms of reducing the level of conflict and violence in missions which have 
some degree of operational consent. These studies also report that most operations fail to bring 
parties together in a negotiation process focused on resolving the underlying issues that led them to 
war.  
 
MINURSO’s outcomes so far follow this pattern. Its success has been, like most peacekeeping 
operations, limited to halting violent interactions between warring parties and it has failed to 
implement the other aspects of its mandate (reducing and lodging troops, exchange of POWs, the 
freeing of political detainees, returning refugees to their homes, de-mining activities, human rights’ 
protection, confidence building measures, UN transitional administration, organisation of both the 
campaign for the referendum and the referendum itself).  
 
Thus, MINURSO has been categorised within the group of the so-called frozen peacekeeping 
missions (the operations in Cyprus and Lebanon would also be included in this group). These 
missions have been totally unsuccessful at bringing parties together in a negotiation process.  
 
The peacekeeping operations in Cyprus and Lebanon were initiated in the Cold War period to avoid 
conflict escalation. On the other hand, MINURSO was adopted at the onset of the post-Cold War 
period and was mandated to promote conflict resolution in the Western Sahara. MINURSO adopted a 
peacebuilding agenda which was to provide self-determination for the Saharan people, disarmament 
and withdrawal of troops and a repatriation programme.  
 
Throughout 80’s, OAU efforts to organise a free and fair referendum for self-determination of the 
Saharan people were jeopardised by Morocco’s attempts to secure its position in the Sahara. This was 
accomplished through shifting diplomacy from the main forums dealing with decolonisation issues, 
namely the UN Fourth Committee and the OAU, to the UN Secretariat (Secretary General’s good 
offices). The peace plan was the result of personal negotiations between King Hassan II and the UN 
Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar. This diplomatic strategy was supported by the US and France in 
the Security Council.  
 
Since MINURSO was put in place in 1991, the mission has been unable to provide space for 
transformative conflict resolution because UN peacemaking efforts have been constrained to a great 
extent by Morocco in connivance with the most powerful members of the Security Council.  In this 
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sense, the mission has failed at developing a multitrack diplomatic approach (Diamond and 
McDonald 1996; Lederach 1997), i.e. involving local constituencies in the political decisions taken 
by party leaders and international diplomats in relation to peacemaking, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding processes. 
 
The UN Secretariat peacemaking strategy was inadequate as it was neither based on a realistic 
assessment of the political scenario in which the mission was set up nor on the means required in 
order to guide the operation towards successful completion. Moreover, the secretariat’s authoritative 
approach to the implementation of the peace plan and, more specifically, to the criteria for the 
identification of voters limited the chances of the operation’s success. In fact, international human 
rights organisations and former diplomats of MINURSO have claimed that the secretariat's 
policymaking was biased in favour of Morocco (Rudy: 1995).  
 
The mission’s success in its peacekeeping tasks has been to some extent partial. MINURSO has 
focused mainly on the effects of institutionalised, ‘government sanctioned’ violence i.e. maintaining 
the ceasefire between the warring parties. On one hand, it has successfully limited the number of 
casualties by monitoring and maintaining the ceasefire. However, on the other hand, the mission has 
not been able to take an active stance against political violence: preventing human rights violations, 
promoting the rule of law, ensuring the liberation of all POWs or clarifying the fate of Saharawi 
disappearances. In addition, the mission has not allocated resources for investigating the problem of 
land mine related casualties.  
 
Progress made by MINURSO in implementing the post-settlement peacebuilding measures outlined 
in the UN settlement proposals (confidence-building measures for the return of refugees, land mine 
clearance, UNHCR repatriation operation planning, code of conduct for the referendum campaign, 
cantonment and reduction of troops) has been hindered mainly by Morocco’s unwillingness to 
cooperate with the mission and also by the Security Council and the Secretariat’s reluctance to use 
their leverage on Morocco. 
 
The stalemate in the peace process has in turn aggravated the humanitarian situation of Saharan 
refugees. In addition, MINURSO lacks the mechanisms to put in place a comprehensive 
peacebuilding agenda so as to support the protection of the Saharawi people whose rights are not 
being sufficiently promoted in the current political framework. 
 
The lessons learned from MINURSO shed light on the extent to which the implementation of peace 
operations’ mandates needs to be linked with thorough clarification and integration of UN 
peacekeeping practice in conflict resolution processes. For instance, the transformative role of peace 
operations can be enhanced by strengthening the links between the UN agents and civil society 
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organisations. Progress in these reforms is highly dependent on the International Community’s 
willingness to engage in a larger democratisation process of the UN decision making model. 
 
In brief, the Western Sahara operation has only been able to function as a conflict stabiliser operation 
because contention has been its main function and power politics have hindered MINURSO’s 
transformative role.   
 
4.   A Critical Approach to Peacekeeping 
This section examines the analytical potential of using Foucault’s concept of power in conflict 
resolution and peacekeeping theory. This approach draws on the ideas elaborated by Betts Fetherston 
in the section ‘Conflict Resolution/Peacekeeping as Discursive Practice: Power’ in her journal article 
Theoretical Frameworks for Peacekeeping (Fetherston 2000). 
 
Foucault understood power as a force that “transverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, produces discourse”. Foucault also refers to power as a juridical concept “carrying 
the force of a prohibition” that is related to the notion of repression. Foucault rejects a purely 
negative nature of power: “if power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but 
to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it?” (Foucault 1984: 51).  
 
Nevertheless, some authors have argued that repression is also an integral element of the production 
of power/knowledge in contemporary societies.4 From Foucault’s assumption that “each society has 
its regime of truth…that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” 
(Foucault 1984:73), some authors have asserted that these discourses are sustained by coercive 
mechanisms. In this context violence is understood as a deterrent through which power structures and 
dominant discourses (a regime of truth) are generated at a societal level. The fundamental question is 
whether the production of power/knowledge can function independently from coercive mechanisms. 
This is particularly relevant in war zones, where parties use violence against those who challenge 
their regime of truth. 
 
Most peace research is based on Galtung’s ideas on peace and violence. Galtung defines three 
different types of violence: direct, structural and cultural. Direct violence is visible physical and/or 
verbal behaviour, cultural violence is related to the promotion of heroic, patriotic, or patriarchal 
values, which seek to justify violence, and structural violence is caused by socio-economic structures 
which are repressive, exploitative or alienating (Galtung 1990). In turn, Galtung defines negative 
peace as the absence of direct violence and positive peace as the removal of cultural and structural 
violence. 
                                                 
4 See further research on repressive power (Nordstrom and Martin 1992).  
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In this regard, repressive power aims at imposing a societal regime of truth through the use of direct 
violence. The Foucaultian concept of power as a positive force which produces knowledge 
(disciplines) and “normalises” (Foucault 1984: 193) social life can be related to Galtung’s concept of 
cultural violence. In particular, the production of discourses of violence and militarism are 
inextricably linked to the process of disciplinarisation of society. The production of 
power/knowledge and regimes of truth can also be associated to the normalisation of structural 
violence. In this sense, positive forms of power are related to the production and socialisation of 
cultural practices and socio-economic structures. As Foucault puts it: 
 
“What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only 
weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, its induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which 
runs through the whole social body… (Foucault 1984: 119).”  
 
Fetherston has underlined the possibilities of using Foucault’s genealogical approach to 
power/knowledge for examining issues related to peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Foucault 
described the extent to which the introduction of a ‘scientific’ epistemology to study society in the 
Modern Era5, which was based on the Natural Science model (the emergence of a Social Science), 
has subjugated a whole range of specific (a-scientific) ‘knowledges’ (Fetherston 2000). Foucault 
explained that this process of scientific normalisation of social life is related to the emergence of new 
technologies of power and the enactment of the discourse of modernity, which stands for a regime of 
scientific truths. This discourse is mainly enacted by a new flourishing socio-economic class, the 
bourgeoisie, which has grown alongside industrial development and the formation of the 
Nation/States since the 17th century.  In short, the emergence of the Social Sciences and the 
production of objectified forms of knowledge have led to attempts to rationalise social life. In turn, 
this rationalisation has produced a hierarchy of forms of knowledge, marginalizing non-scientific 
forms of knowledge. As Barry Smart puts it: 
 
“One of the principal objectives of Foucault’s analysis is to contest ‘the scientific hierarchisation 
of knowledges and the effects intrinsic to their power’ implied in the above – not by constructing 
a higher, more general and more powerful theory, but by developing critiques of both 
objectifying and subjectifying forms of knowledge, action, and their respective effects, in order to 
reveal and thereby help reactivate the various forms of subjugated knowledge and local criticism 
of ‘an autonomous, non-centralised kind…whose validity is not dependent on the approval of the 
established regimes of thought’ (Smart 1994: 215-216).” 
 
In this regard, the production of power/knowledge by a third party - i.e. peacekeeping - is related to 
an attempt to normalise international social life. John Burton stressed that peacekeeping involves the 
institutionalisation of conflict (Burton 1990). Galtung related peacekeeping practice to his concept of 
negative peace (Galtung 1976). In this sense, most studies on peacekeeping point out its efficiency in 
                                                 
5 From the end of the eighteenth century to the present day. 
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terms of reducing the level of conflict violence in missions which have some degree of operational 
consent. These studies also report that most operations fail to bring parties together in a negotiation 
process focused on resolving the underlying issues that led them to war. It can be argued that 
peacekeeping is very successful at promoting negative peace but fails at promoting positive peace. 
The aim of this critical assessment of peacekeeping practice is to look at whether peacekeeping can 
promote specific forms of power/knowledge which can, in turn, promote positive peace.  
 
Some Scholars within the field of Conflict Resolution have found problems with the “scientific” 
assumptions underpinning Conflict Resolution theory (Fetherston 2000; Salem 1997). Fetherston 
draws her criticism of Conflict Resolution from Foucault’s ideas on power and truth:  
 
“Delivering rational understandings and practices through conflict resolution methodologies – 
including peacekeeping - is part of rendering a social body ready to accept, for example, neo-
liberal forms of social/economic/political organisation Fetherston (2000: 200).”  
 
Alternatively, Paul Salem has based his critique of Western Conflict Resolution on Said’s concept of 
‘Orientalism’, which is based on a Foucaultian approach to power/knowledge. Salem has critically 
assessed Western Conflict Resolution theory and practices – i.e. peacekeeping - and claims that this 
discipline is embedded in a discourse which places the notion of peace at the centre of the Western 
value system. He stresses that each culture inherits local (specific) power/knowledge on conflict 
resolution skills. In this sense, he points out that Western Conflict Resolution practices are based on 
Christian values and the centrality of peace in this discourse is as fundamental as, for instance, the 
centrality of justice is in Islamic value systems (Salem 1993; 1997).  
 
However, the idea of peace with justice is common in the political discourse of many populations 
targeted by cultural and structural violence. For instance, Anthony M. Clohesy has pointed out the 
central role of the concept of justice in the political discourse of the Irish Republican Movement 
(Clohesy 2000). 
 
Alternatively, the production of discourses based on the centrality of peace can also be related to 
attempts to legitimise cultural and structural violence by state powers and International 
Organisations. In this regard, the US led ‘war against terrorism’ is presented, at a discursive level, as 
a struggle for peace. Nevertheless, this struggle omits the underlying cultural and structural roots of 
terror. As Paul Salem has stated: 
 
“All Successful ‘empires’ develop an inherent interest in peace. The ideology of peace reinforces 
a status quo that is favourable to the dominant power. The Romans, for example, preached a Pax 
Romana, the British favoured a Pax Britannica, and the Americans pursue – consciously or not - 
a Pax Americana (Salem 1997:12).” 
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I suggest using a genealogical approach to the concept of peace, in which negative and positive 
approaches to peace are accepted and hence, the discourse of modernity can incorporate local forms 
of power/knowledge.  In the Western Sahara case, discourses of positive and negative peace are 
conflictingly embedded in the sources of power/knowledge of the conflict. The discourse of the 
Saharan liberation movement, the POLISARIO Front, is based on a spiritual concept of peace, which 
is exemplified by the slogan of the fifth POLISARIO Congress held in 1982, ‘The Whole Country or 
Martyrdom’ (Hodges 1984). However, the discourses underpinning western diplomacy in Western 
Sahara (i.e. UN peacemaking) focus on the promotion of negative peace through peacekeeping 
practice. 
 
5.   UN Peacemaking in the Sahara: The Stability Model 
This section suggests looking at the MINURSO operation as a projection of Western 
power/knowledge drawing on a Foucaltian analysis of the relationship between systems of power and 
truth. The main argument is that MINURSO has not only failed to  promote conflict resolution, but 
that it has on the contrary contributed to sustain the uneven balance of power between both parties 
which unleashed the violent struggle in the first.   
 
 
France and the US’ acquiescence of Moroccan policies in relation to the Saharan question have 
hindered the efforts made by international organisations (UN and OAU) to promote conflict 
resolution in Western Sahara. Since the end of the Cold War Western policies concerning North 
Africa have been based on conflict containment and the promotion of stability. This is the 
cornerstone of their policy in a region which is perceived as potentially highly unstable. This is due 
to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa and, in particular, to the dramatic 
proportions of the Algerian civil war (Zoubir 2002). In this context, the Alawite monarchy ruling 
Morocco is perceived as a strong ally of the West, not only for the regime’s tough policies directed at 
containing fundamentalism but also for the country’s geo-strategic assets. This country hosts military 
air bases which are a key strategic asset for the rapid deployment of North American forces in the 
Middle East and South East Asia (Mayer 1983).  
 
Western support for Morocco has been expressed in practice by the abandonment of the process 
leading to the organisation of a referendum for the Saharan people, even though this process is still 
formally endorsed by the UN Security Council. Some analysts claim that the current relegation of the 
POLISARIO Front in the international arena (a liberation movement only partially supported by 
conflict ridden Algeria), is a step towards what has already been defined as the “Palestinisation” of 
the Western Sahara conflict and the formation of terrorist organisations fighting for the rights of the 
Western Saharans (Núñez Villaverde 2002). But as Wayne Madsen has pointed out this path is 
unlikely to remove the oppression and violence in the Sahara: 
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“If the Saharawis, out of desperation, break the cease fire and go to war with Morocco, the anti-
terrorism measures undertaken by the United States may seal their fate. 
 
All the State Department has to do is simply declare POLISARIO and the Saharawi Arab 
Democratic Republic terrorist organizations. Their international assets would be frozen, their 
leaders would be arrested and could be tried by secret U.S. military tribunals… (Counterpunch 
2003).” 
 
The UN Secretariat authoritative approach to the implementation of the peace plan and, more 
specifically, to the criteria for the identification of voters limited the chances of the operation being 
successful because the UN sided with Morocco and was unable to report on this party’s lack of 
consent in the operation. In fact, as described above, international human rights organisations and 
former diplomats of MINURSO have claimed that the secretariat's policymaking was biased in 
favour of Morocco (Rudy 1995). 
  
Conflict Resolution theoretical approaches to third party intervention in asymmetric conflicts like the 
Saharan conflict (oppressor – top dog - versus oppressed – underdog) stress the need for the third 
party to join forces with the under dog in order to enable a transformation of power relations and in 
particular, a transformation of those structures and discourses which sustain violence and oppression 
(Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999).  
 
In relation to the UN peacemaking and peacekeeping model of third party intervention, academics 
and practitioners agree there is a need for more robust mandates which will enable the organisation to 
implement peacekeeping and peacebuilding programs. In MINURSO’s case, it can be argued that the 
top dog, Morocco, has taken full control over the operation and has even used a ‘sticks and carrots’ 
strategy towards MINURSO, managing their consent to the mission as a bargaining chip. The aim of 
this strategy has been to ensure that the referendum plan is not put into practice. In this case, third 
party intervention has not promoted a transformation of the power relations but rather it has been 
manipulated by Morocco and has served the top dog’s purposes of maintaining the status quo. 
 
This research project argues that in the Saharan conflict the UN secretariat peacemaking process has 
promoted a settlement which is favourable to the dominant power and its ally in the region (Pax 
Americana). Their approach is underpinned by unquestionable ‘scientific knowledge’ originating in 
the Conflict Management/Resolution theoretical discourse. The UN peacemaking discourse in the 
Sahara is based on the assumption that the peaceful transformation of conflictive relationships 
involves a change in the parties’ perceptions and interests from win-lose to win-win outcomes. This 
discourse, for instance, explains MINURSO’s failure to implement its mandate and to organise the 
referendum by pointing to the parties’ problematic aspirations in the peace process: in brief, both 
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parties have a winner take all mentality. Elements of this discourse are visible in this fragment from 
one of Kofi Annan’s reports on the Western Sahara (2001): 
 
“Because of the parties’ unwillingness to work together to resolve the various problems, the 
United Nations started submitting proposals to them to bridge their differences. As a result, both 
sides became accustomed to receiving from the United Nations suggestions and technical 
solutions each time there was a problem, which the parties, in turn, would proceed to revise or 
dilute through long and arduous negotiations until they were satisfied that they had safeguarded 
their own best interests. The process thus became a zero-sum game, which each side felt it 
absolutely had to win since, owing to the nature of the agreement that the United Nations was 
trying to implement, the referendum would produce one winner and one loser and the stakes were 
therefore extremely high (UN Document S/2001/613).” 
 
Therefore, the UN Secretariat’s discourse was based on the assumption that the plan could not be 
implemented because its outcome would be a “zero-sum game” (UN Document S/2001/613). 
Elements of this discourse can also be identified in the ideas expressed by the UN Personal Envoy for 
the Sahara, former US Secretary of State, James Baker: 
 
“In addition, my Personal Envoy expressed concern that the parties had so far failed to negotiate 
these problems because of the high level of animosity existing between them. In his view, neither 
party had shown any disposition to depart from the ‘winner-take all’ mentality or appeared 
willing to discuss any possible political solutions in which each could get some, but not all, of 
what it wanted and would allow the other side to do the same (UN Document S/2002/178).” 
 
James Baker has been one of the main promoters of the so-called third way for the Sahara, involving 
autonomy for the Sahara within Morocco. Baker conceives the third way as a positive sum game 
approach to conflict resolution in Western Sahara: 
 
“It represents a fair and balanced approach, providing each side some, but perhaps not all, of 
what it wants. The peace plan, therefore, represents a compromise (UN Document S/2003/565).” 
 
This shows the link between the UN peacemaking strategy in the Sahara and a particular Western 
discourse on the settlement of disputes, which examines conflicts as objectified units of study and at 
the discursive level, claims to be based on scientific knowledge. That is, a resolution of the conflict, 
which is based on the ‘positivist faith’ in science to resolve social problems and accommodate all 
parties through positive sum games and ‘cake sharing’ processes (Burton 1990). As Salem has 
pointed out, “a neutral, ‘objective’ approach to conflict assumes a certain neutral and ‘objective’ 
view of the world (Salem 1997: 18).” 
 
Foucault stressed that the emergence of the so-called discourse of modernity, with the proliferation of 
scientific knowledge in the social sphere, is related to maintaining a certain social order and class 
structure. Therefore, the production of power and knowledge are inextricably interrelated. From this 
perspective, Conflict Resolution can only lead to social transformation if it addresses the potential 
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harms of using discourses which can be used by dominant groups to maintain the status quo. As 
Fetherston emphasizes:  
 
“The extent to which conflict resolution and peacekeeping in both theory and practice are 
fundamentally mis-directed is the extent to which they are unable to make visible the political 
framework within which they are formed… (Fetherston 2000:198).” 
 
In this sense, this thesis argues that the mission has been biased in favour of Morocco mainly because 
the UN’s production of power/knowledge was constrained by the power dynamics within the 
international system. In this way, the mission was used to promote Pax Americana. In particular, the 
mission only reported those human rights violations which did not involve holding the top dog 
accountable. Since the mission was set up in 1991, MINURSO has focused on reporting those actions 
which are related to containing the violence against the Moroccan regime (for instance, the situation 
of Moroccan POWS in the POLISARIO camps). Moreover, it omitted or misreported the acts that 
obstructed the peace plan and human rights abuses perpetrated by Morocco.6  
 
In this context, MINURSO’s peacekeeping can be seen as a way of promoting the status-quo and 
legitimising the same order of power relations which was actually at the root of the conflict. 
MINURSO did not try to change the rationale oppressor vs. oppressed but rather its purpose was to 
contain the conflict and promote Pax Americana in an area perceived as potentially highly unstable. 
 
On the other hand, the parties’ production of power/knowledge in the conflict is associated to some 
extent with the legitimisation of current socio-political structures both in Morocco and in the SADR. 
In Morocco, the Saharan provinces have been integrated in the mechanisms of legitimisation of the 
regime, which are based on the symbolic power of the king as a Commander of the Faithful.  
 
The Saharan policy of the Moroccan State was embedded in the French protectorate discourse and 
political practices i.e. a projection of Morocco expanding its empire towards the west and south. The 
leader of Istiqlal, Allal El Fasi, put the doctrine of the Greater Morocco in writing in 1956.7 Allal el 
Fasi set the agenda to regain the Moroccan empire which included the Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, 
the North of Mali and parts of bordering areas with Algeria. The Greater Moroccan map reproduced 
the borders of the Almoravide dynasty empire (11th to 12th century). Adopting this nationalistic 
agenda was a way for the King of Morocco Mohammed V to ensure Istiqal’s support for his 
leadership. The monarchy also aimed to legitimise the royal power in the “re-construction” of 
Greater Morocco (Hodges 1984). 
                                                 
6 See Solà (2004) Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
7 Since Moroccan independence (1956), the consolidation of the Alawite family as the rulers of Morocco has 
been very much supported by the rural elites and counts on the cooperation of the largest political party, the 
Istiqal. The Istiqal is the nationalist party of the “Young Moroccans” and they have been in charge of several 
ministries since the formation of the first independent government of Morocco. In 1958, a member of Istiqal, 
Muhammad Ahmed Balafrej, was appointed as the Moroccan primer minister.   
 13 
 
 
Morocco’s system of regime legitimisation is not permeable to transformative policies in the Western 
Sahara conflict. Western liberal democratic values impinged on the principles of MINURSO’s 
mandate. In particular, the principle of the people’s sovereignty is at odds with the Moroccan 
monarchy’s production of power/knowledge. This relevant issue might have been overlooked by the 
drafters of the 1988 UN settlement proposals for the Western Sahara. The political expression of this 
principle, namely the organisation of a free and fair referendum process through which the Saharan 
people can decide by themselves whether they want to be ruled by the Moroccan king or have an 
independent state has no room in the dominant Moroccan political culture based on the sacredness of 
the king as the Commander of the Faithful and guarantor of the territorial integrity of the kingdom.  
 
Moroccan political constitutional culture is based on the reinvention of traditional forms of 
legitimisation and the religious authority of the king. For instance, political institutional forms like 
the baia and the shura regulate that the people’s political participation is subordinated to the king’s 
rule (Tozy 2000).  
 
On the other hand, since the beginning of the war in the Sahara, the POLISARIO Front has been 
committed to a process of modernising traditional Saharan society, which involved a drastic attempt 
to overcome tribalism as a form of social organisation. The POLISARIO Front was formed by a 
group of Saharan students from the University of Rabat in 1972. Their families had migrated to 
Southern Morocco during the Franco-Spanish Operation Ouragan in 1958 against the Liberation 
Front Army who fought for the independence of Morocco and the Sahara in the 50’s. The spiritual 
father of the Front was El Uali Mustafa Sayed. His father was an ex-combatant of the Liberation 
Front (Garcia 2002). 
 
Historically, the family or cabila was the main socio-political unit of Saharan society. For members 
of the cabila, the asabyia or tribal loyalty system organised social relations and helped the most 
vulnerable within the group. Saharan traditional society was highly stratified and hierarchical.  In 
each cabila or family some elders, the sheiks or tribal chiefs, were the main source of 
power/knowledge. Their role was to transmit Saharawi traditions, their ancestral laws and the history 
of their families to the younger members of their community. The sheiks also mediated in conflicts 
between the members of the family (Caro Baroja 1990).  
 
Paradoxically, the end of the war and the peace process has taken place at the same time that the 
struggle for power and contradictions within the POLISARIO have boosted tribalism. The ceasefire 
opened up a process of rediscovering their Saharawi people’s identity at a time when a power 
struggle within the POLISARIO front had generated a serious internal crisis. The lack of progress in 
the peace process, i.e. the frustrated identification process, has aggravated the tensions among the 
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Saharawi families and cabilas. For many, the resumption of hostilities is now the only way to 
achieve self-determination and inner peace, as the war was also an element of cohesion among all the 
tribal groupings of Saharawi society.   
 
MINURSO has been instrumental in the process of ‘returning’ to the traditional society. The 
historian Hodges explains how in the 60’s the emergence of Saharawi national awareness was fed to 
some extent by hearing UN resolutions on the self-determination rights of the Saharan people, which 
were broadcasted by international radio stations (Hodges 1984). During the UN identification process 
the Saharawi National Radio publicised those individuals and tribal groupings who were to be 
identified. As the tribal identity had been taboo in the 80’s, public information on the UN process led 
to a process of ‘rediscovering’ family roots, especially for some young people who had been 
educated abroad (Caratini 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, the Saharawi people conceive the UN as a conflict resolution tool to protect their 
rights. The Saharan people endorsed Pérez de Cuéllar’s settlement proposals in 1988 hoping that a 
UN monitored peace plan would lead to the referendum and full independence for SADR. However, 
the protracted impasse in the process leading to the organisation of the referendum has also led to 
growing support for the resumption of hostilities: “we were better off when the fight was on” is a 
recurrent opinion among Saharawi refugees and expatriates. The ceasefire and the peace process are 
perceived in negative terms by most people. Their expectations about the role of the UN as a conflict 
resolver have been frustrated.  The war is perceived now as the best way to pursue their communal 
interests and needs. In the last few years the POLISARIO elite have made intense efforts to convince 
their constituencies to keep to the diplomatic channel. However, many young Saharans feel attracted 
to the martyr culture (Caratini 2003).  
 
The production of power/knowledge in the conflict is a key element in the political survival of both 
parties’ elites. This is also reflected in the high degree of militarization and societal control that has 
been maintained. For instance, both parties maintain movement restrictions over their population. 
Military checkpoints can be found on the roads of the main Saharan cities (Mazuré 1998) and the 
refugee camps of Tindouf. Saharawis and Moroccans responsible for human rights abuses against the 
Saharawi population in the past still hold governmental positions in Tindouf and in the Moroccan 
held Western Sahara. This shows the extent to which power holders use social coercion and 
intimidation to achieve their political goals.8 
 
For instance, the control both parties’ have over public information also shows the prevalence of 
cultures of violence in Western Sahara. The parties wage a propaganda war through the radio 
                                                 
8 See literature on cultures of violence (Nordstrom 1994).  
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emissions. According to Salek Muftah, a journalist of the Sahara Press Service (SPS), “MINURSO is 
a dirty war”.9 In Tindouf the radio broadcasts programmes on the struggle against the Moroccan 
invader and the UN efforts to achieve self-determination for the Saharan People. Moroccan Radio 
emphasises POLISARIO’s internal problems and hardships suffered by the Moroccan population 
kidnapped in Algeria.10  
 
Researchers, and journalist are banned from entering Western Sahara or their movements are 
constrained and under high surveillance. Both parties are fearful that foreign reports may weaken 
their position. In particular, human rights organisations have denounced the lack of accountability 
mechanisms to prosecute human rights offenders on both sides.11 
 
6.   The Conflict Resolution Model versus the Stability Model  
As this research project highlights, Conflict Resolution as an academic field can have a larger impact 
on peacekeeping research by exploring in more detail the parties’ production of power/knowledge. 
Efforts made by academics to link Conflict Resolution theory and post-Cold War peacekeeping need 
to explore in what ways power politics influence peacekeeping as an institution, and to what extent 
peacekeeping and its projection of power/knowledge in some cases, i.e. MINURSO, serve the 
interests of  politico-military elites. 
 
At first glance, Morocco’s lack of cooperation with MINURSO appears to support the arguments put 
forward by authors such as Huntington (Huntington 1993) who have diagnosed our times as a clash 
of civilisations between the West and its projection of Western type values and non-Western 
civilisations such as Islamic societies. However, this opposition between the West and the rest 
oversimplifies the role played by the UN in the post-Cold War period. In some cases, the promotion 
of the stability model, in detriment to the conflict resolution model, has responded to Western 
policies of containing violence associated with Islamic radicalism. According to the US State 
Department, MINURSO has proven to be an effective safety net for the stability of the current 
political regimes in North Africa. 
 
These policies of opposition to Islamic radicalism have brought the West to seek alliances with 
conservative elites in the Arab world. Authoritarianism, poor human rights records and high levels of 
corruption are common features among the political practices of Arab state elites. In turn, these elites 
protect Western economic interests. However, unemployment, poverty, and political repression 
                                                 
9 Personal interview with Salek Muftah, Saharan Press Service (February 2004). 
10 Personal interview Mohamed Salem Brahim, the Coordinator of the Spanish Edition of the Saharawi  
    National Radio (January 2004). 
11 France Liberte Foundation, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Canadian Lawyers  
    Association for International Human Rights CLAIHR. The U.S. Department of State has also released  
    reports on human rights practices in Western Sahara.  
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trigger the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in these countries. Others have criticised peacekeeping as 
being a tool for the promotion of Western liberal democratic values (Duffield 1997). But as argued 
above, the UN has not only promoted Western values in North Africa but has also promoted the 
stability of current political regimes. 
 
Since 2003, Morocco has arrested more than 2,000 suspected terrorists. International human rights 
organisations have accused the Moroccan security services of severe abuses against suspected 
terrorists in the Royal Gendarmerie detention centres (Amnesty International 2003). Repressive 
policies boost the cycle of violence, terrorism and counter-terrorism. The Algerian regime’s 
antiterrorist policies have not stopped the bloodshed and the country is still submerged in a war 
between the state security forces and some Islamic fundamentalist groups. The Saharan desert is 
perceived by the West as a hiding place for Salafist armed groups and the US administration is 
developing the so-called Pan-Sahel Initiative to train the African armies in the bordering areas 
between the Sahel and the Sahara in counter-insurgency tactics (Keenan 2004). Aware of this 
development, the pro-regime Moroccan press has denounced links between the POLISARIO Front 
and some of these groups (Libération 2004). In turn, the POLISARIO leadership is worried about 
being labelled a terrorist organisation and they have ceased to threaten to resume hostilities as a 
means of putting pressure on Morocco and the UN.  
 
The war against terrorism has led to a rapid increase in the militarization of international social life, 
which has led to widespread violence and the broadening of inequalities. In the long term, the 
negative effects of this securitisation could be more costly for richer countries than providing some 
policies aimed at promoting democracy, civil society’s political participation and the rule-of-law.  In 
this context, Conflict Resolution has the potential to look for alternatives to the use of coercion and 
power politics. 
 
Since the downfall of the Soviet Union, the main concern of Western powers for North Africa has 
been the promotion of stability (Soudan in L'intelligent  2003). This policy has led them to 
collaborate with corrupt and repressive regimes with a view to containing the threat of a 
‘talibanisation’ in North African countries in which fundamentalist parties have the widespread 
support of the people. In June 1990, The Islamic Salvation Front’s (FIS) victory in the Algerian local 
elections led to the army intervening, putting an end to democratic reforms. Political turmoil led the 
country to a brutal civil war which has caused at least 100,000 victims. The army intervention has 
proven to be detrimental to their aim to contain the terrorist threat, as many young people joined the 
terrorist organisations (Hanune 1996; Impagliazzo and Giro 1999; Yous 2001).  
  
Nevertheless, some Islamist parties are willing to play a part in democratic processes, for instance, 
the Justice and Development Party or AKP has ruled Turkey since it obtained 34.3% of the votes in 
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the elections held on 3 November 2002. In Algeria, efforts at conflict resolution promoted by the 
Community of Saint Egidio resulted in the creation of the Rome platform in 1999. The promotion of 
peace and dialogue between all the political parties of Algeria includes the leadership of the FIS.  
 
Conflict resolvers and UN peacekeeping can contribute to these efforts by enhancing the local 
capacity for conflict resolution and by cooperating with organisations working for human rights 
accountability. The UN conflict resolution capabilities can only be strengthened by enhancing 
International Law and the rights of minority groups as a basis of peaceful coexistence between 
communal groups and states. Conflict resolution in Western Sahara, as an exercise in promoting the 
people’s right to self-determination, is related to this framework.  
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